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Abstract 
This study examines the role of household security devices in producing the domestic burglary falls in England and 
Wales. It extends the study of the security hypothesis as an explanation for the ‘crime drop’. Crime Survey for England 
and Wales data are analysed from 1992 to 2011/12 via a series of data signatures indicating the nature of, and change 
in, the relationship between security devices and burglary. The causal role of improved security is strongly indicated 
by a set of interlocking data signatures: rapid increases in the prevalence of security, particularly in the availability of 
combinations of the most effective devices (door and window locks plus security lighting); a steep decline in the pro-
portion of households without security accompanied by disproportionate rises in their burglary risk; and the decline 
being solely in forced rather than unforced entries to households. The study concludes that there is strong evidence 
that security caused the decline in burglary in England and Wales in the 1990s. Testing the security hypothesis across 
a wider range of crime types, countries and forms of security than examined to date, is required both to understand 
the crime drop and to derive lessons for future crime prevention practice and policy.
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Background
Sustained crime falls across a wide array of offences 
began in the United States in the early 1980s and in many 
other countries from the early 1990s. These have been 
referred to as the international crime drop (Tonry 2014; 
van Dijk et al. 2012) with the suggestion that there may 
have been a global crime drop (Tseloni et al. 2010). The 
widespread falls in crime came as a surprise to criminol-
ogy (Farrell et al. 2008) and have posed a major challenge 
to those interested in understanding crime trends (Tonry 
2014).
Reflecting the earlier crime downturn in the United 
States, early efforts to explain the crime drop stressed 
distinctive developments there (Blumstein and Wall-
man 2000). At least seventeen explanations have been 
identified in academic studies to date (Farrell et al. 2010; 
Farrell 2013). Due to their singular focus on the United 
States and inapplicability elsewhere, many of the early 
frontrunners have been discounted and categorised, with 
the benefit of hindsight, as parochial (Farrell et al. 2014; 
Tonry 2014). Most of the others appear to be contra-
dicted by a range of specific evidence as well as the fact 
that they lack consistency with broader sets of evidence: 
They are inconsistent with the fact that crime rose for 
several decades previously; that some crime types, such 
as cyber-crimes and theft of some electronic products, 
have increased; and that there was significant variation in 
the timing and trajectory of crime declines both between 
and within countries (Farrell et  al. 2014; Tseloni et  al. 
2010). The surviving hypothesis is the ‘security hypoth-
esis’ (Farrell et  al. 2011a): The crime drops are a func-
tion of reduced opportunities, which have been largely 
brought about by increases in the extent and quality of 
security, an idea first introduced by Clarke and Newman 
(2006) and by Van Dijk (2006).
The security hypothesis is underpinned by the crime 
opportunities theoretical framework of rational choice 
and routine activities. The link between crime and crime 
opportunities, and the role of security in their reduction, 
has long been established (Mayhew et al. 1976). The secu-
rity hypothesis suggests that the infusion of everyday life 
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with increasingly well-designed, unobtrusive and publicly 
acceptable security has led to the substantial crime drops 
that have been observed (see Tilley et al. 2015a). In addition 
there may well be some collective effects beyond the opera-
tion of individual devices, especially if potential offenders 
no longer assume that they can easily commit some types 
of crime with low risks of apprehension. Indeed increased 
security is the most common reason for the crime drop 
according to offenders interviewed in the four Austral-
ian states of New South Wales, Queensland, Western and 
South Australia (Brown 2015a). This fits with the rational 
choice theoretical perspective, according to which secu-
rity improvements can be expected to increase the actual 
or perceived risk and effort of committing crimes or reduce 
the actual or perceived reward from them (Clarke 2012).
The security explanation of the crime drop is compati-
ble with evidence that (a) different crime types have 
fallen at different times in different places, reflecting vari-
ation in how improved security has spread, and (b) par-
ticular types of security measures affect crime patterns 
differentially, producing distinctive crime-change ‘signa-
tures’ (Farrell et al. 2014; Tseloni et al. 2010). Indeed, one 
of the advantages of the security hypothesis over other 
explanations of the crime drop is that it does not assume 
that all crime has dropped. It would expect crime 
increases where new crime opportunities emerge. Any 
new developments may inadvertently create new crime 
opportunities whose inhibition has not been built in from 
the start (Pease 1997), especially for CRAVED goods 
(concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable 
and disposable) (Clarke 1999; Ekblom and Tilley 2000).1 
This appears to have been the case with mobile phone 
theft (Thompson 2014; Office for National Statistics 
[ONS] 2013a) and cybercrime (McGuire and Dowling 
2013). Thus, interspersed with an overall crime drop for 
many crimes produced by security increases, the security 
hypothesis would expect rises in some specific crimes 
where new opportunities have been created.
The diversity and ubiquity of security improvements 
create, however, huge challenges for testing the hypothe-
sis as a whole. The task is that of specifying hypotheses 
that can be tested retrospectively with the available data, 
following a crime type—and country—specific approach 
(Farrell et  al. 2008, 2010). Efforts to test the security 
hypothesis so far have focused on car crime. Car crime 
has fallen dramatically and there is mounting cross-
national empirical evidence (based on available data that 
relate to the devices fitted to the vehicle itself ) that cen-
tral door locking, alarms and electronic immobilisers are 
especially important contributors to the drops in theft of 
1 Pires and Clarke (2012) have suggested that CRAVED might be updated 
with CRAAVED suggesting available could be replaced with accessible and 
abundant.
and from vehicles (Bässman 2011; Brown 2013; Farrell 
et al. 2011b; Fujita and Maxfield 2012; Kriven and Ziersch 
2007; Van Ours and Vollaard 2016). That said, it has to be 
acknowledged that these do not exhaust the ways in 
which the security of cars may have been increased.2 To 
our knowledge, the only previous study that touched 
upon longer term domestic burglary trends3 and house 
security comes from the Netherlands: Vollaard and van 
Ours (2011) conducted a cost-benefit analysis of a gov-
ernment regulation requiring burglary-proof windows 
and doors in new housing. They established that the 
built-in security in new homes reduced their burglary 
risks by 26% per year. It also contributed a net 5% to the 
overall burglary drop in that country in the decade fol-
lowing the regulation’s introduction.4
The present study contributes to research on the secu-
rity hypothesis with a particular focus on domestic bur-
glary in England and Wales. The security interventions to 
prevent domestic burglary have been unsystematic and 
non-universal: with the adoption of secured by design, 
some have been building age related, such as in the Neth-
erlands study above, while others have been retrofitted to 
older properties. By contrast, the security interventions 
against vehicle crime were universal, implemented at the 
vehicle production phase and rolled out incrementally 
with vehicle age.5 Therefore this work moves the discus-
sion on from car crime to explore the security hypothesis 
in relation to the decline in domestic burglary. It explic-
itly examines the security hypothesis over a longer period 
and a wider array of security combinations than previ-
ously, as well as with respect to burglars’ modus oper-
andi. Thereby it expands crime signatures analysis to 
accommodate the challenges due to the different nature 
of the security interventions in residential properties 
compared to cars (Farrell et al. 2011b). We argue that the 
increases in availability of household security devices, 
coupled with an increased efficacy of security devices, 
provides a compelling explanation for the decline in bur-
glary in England and Wales since the mid-1990s.
The next section discusses five key research hypothe-
ses which test the effect of security on domestic burglary 
2 Many car parks have been made more secure via CCTV cameras, barri-
ers and improved lighting, reducing the risk to cars parked in them (Webb 
2005; Smith et  al. 2003; Poyner 1992; Tilley 1993). Also, in Australia and 
England and Wales new car registration arrangements have made it more 
difficult to change the identity of a stolen car (Brown 2015b; Webb 2005).
3 A number of studies has examined the short term effects of target hard-
ening and security policy initiatives, including Secured by Design evalu-
ations, on domestic burglary (for example, Armitage and Monchuk 2011; 
Ekblom 1996).
4 The study did not examine the effect of other security devices or security 
fitted retrospectively in existing homes both of which may be responsible 
for the bulk of Dutch national burglary falls.
5 With thanks to the Anonymous Reviewer who pointed this out.
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falls. An overview of the data and analytical strategy of 
this study follows. The "Findings" section is organised 
in five subsections each corresponding to a research 
hypothesis. Thereafter the theoretical and policy implica-
tions of the findings are discussed. Recommendations for 
further research and replications for testing the security 
hypothesis for the crime drop conclude this study.
Domestic burglary and the security hypothesis
The remainder of this paper focuses specifically on the 
security hypothesis as it relates to domestic burglary 
in England and Wales. The research hypothesis is that 
improvements in security have played a major part in 
producing widely observed drops in burglary. Specifi-
cally the following changes would be expected if secu-
rity has been important in producing the fall in domestic 
burglaries:
1. An increase in overall levels of household security.
2. A decrease in the proportion of households with no 
security and an increase in their relative burglary 
risk.6
3. An increase in the installation of more effica-
cious security devices and combinations of security 
devices.
4. An improvement in the efficacy of the security 
devices that are fitted.
5. A much larger drop in burglaries that required that 
security be overcome than in those where no security 
had to be overcome.
If these changes are found they provide support for 
the overall security hypothesis as it relates to domestic 
burglary.
The analysis presented used data from a national vic-
timisation survey that has been conducted since 1982. 
The survey is now called the Crime Survey for England 
and Wales (prior to 2012 it was known as the British 
Crime Survey), and for consistency will be referred to 
here as ‘CSEW’.
Figure  1 shows the trend in domestic burglary from 
January 1981 to March 2012, as indicated from the 
CSEW. There has been a steep fall in burglary in England 
and Wales: numbers of recorded incidents dropped by 
64% and the percentage of burgled households fell from 
7 to 2.1 per 100 households between 1993 and 2011/12 
(authors’ calculation from Table  11a, ONS 2013b: 55). 
Households are three times less likely to be burgled than 
6 The first two hypotheses are distinct: the first refers to an increase in 
security devices per household and the first part of the second to more 
households with any sort (single or multiple) of security or less households 
without any security.
they were in 1993 when CSEW burglary levels peaked. 
The sharpest burglary drop was between 1997 and 
2001/02, at 39.5%—an average 10% per year during this 
short period (authors’ calculation from Figure 10, ibid.). 
Despite some fluctuations from year to year, the under-
lying trend has remained fairly stable since 2004/05, at 
around 700,000 incidents per year with non-statistically 
significant year-on-year variations.
Overall the figure indicates that both burglary with 
entry and attempts have dropped dramatically, although 
the fall in numbers of burglaries with entry began first. 
Attempts did not start falling until 1997, 4  years after 
‘successful’ burglaries. The time lag between the begin-
ning of attempts and burglary with entry falls indicates 
that burglaries fell due to target characteristics encoun-
tered after the target had been selected (such as unantici-
pated guardianship in the form of security) rather than 
offenders’ decisions not to target properties.7 Burglars’ 
‘hit rate’ (burglary with entry over total number of bur-
glaries) has fluctuated around 59% since 1981 and 
attained its highest value (63%) within the period of ris-
ing crime (1981 and 1991). However it reached its mini-
mum of 53% the year attempts peaked, in 1997. It is 
worth noting that alongside burglary rates burglars’ ‘hit 
rate’ has remained fairly stable at 60% since 2004/05. In 
the remainder of this paper, the focus will be on burgla-
ries with entry on the grounds that attempts may be 
thwarted by the presence of effective security devices, 
which the potential offender is unable to overcome, such 
as locks, or discouraged altogether by, say, internal light-
ing.8 Before turning to findings, as they relate to these 
issues, the CSEW data and methodology used in the 
analysis are described.
The Crime Survey for England and Wales
This study’s evidence is based on analyses of sixteen 
CSEW sweeps, conducted between 1992 (referring back 
to events in 1991) and 2011/12, most undertaken in the 
course of the crime drop. The CSEW is a survey of the 
adult (16 years or older) population in England and Wales 
with currently 35,000 respondents per annum and con-
sistently high response rates, between 73 and 83% (Jans-
son 2007; TNS-BRMB 2012). It is regarded as one of the 
7 Simultaneous or preceding drop in attempts compared to burglary with 
entry would have indicated that burglars’ decisions not to target properties 
(perhaps due to low financial returns from this crime type) might have been 
a reason behind the burglary fall. However the ‘typical gain’ for an offender 
does not vary considerably before and after the crime drop. Moreover 
between 2000 and 2013/14, the average value of goods stolen through bur-
glary increased, alongside a decrease in the number of incidents (Shaw et al. 
2015).
8 Therefore security can exert both a positive and negative effect to 
attempts requiring security device—specific analyses to address the role of 
security on attempts falls.
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most rigorous national crime surveys (Hough and Max-
field 2007).9 The CSEW, unlike police data, is not subject 
to changes in counting rules and offence categories, and 
therefore provides comparable year on year crime esti-
mates (Van Dijk and Tseloni 2012).
The survey records crime experiences, including 
domestic burglary. Burglary victims are asked about 
details of incidents, including the security devices fitted to 
their properties at the time of the burglary.10 In addition, a 
randomly selected sub-sample is asked about the security 
devices fitted to their dwellings at the time of the inter-
view. The security information provided by victims at the 
time of the burglary is a unique feature of the CSEW.
The number and type of security devices examined 
in the CSEW has improved slightly over time. Between 
1992 and 1996, they included burglar alarms, double 
locks or/deadlocks, window locks and lights on a timer 
or sensor switch. Between 1998 and 2007/08 questions 
about dummy alarms, window bars/grilles and secu-
rity chains were added, and lights were differentiated 
between indoor lights, and external lights on a timer or 
sensor. Between 2008/09 and 2011/12, CCTV cameras 
were added to the list. In order to obtain adequate sample 
9 For details on the CSEW methodology and questionnaire, see Hough and 
Maxfield (2007), Flatley (2014) and the various CSEW Technical Reports, 
which are accessible via http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?n
scl=Crime+in+England+and+Wales.
10 For repeat victims of domestic burglary the security of the first incident 
experienced is included in this analysis to gauge its preventive effect. An 
initial burglary increases the demand for and use of security devices (Budd 
1999; Philipson and Posner 1996). However victims’ response to a first bur-
glary and whether this alters subsequent burglary risk, whilst acknowledged 
as of great interest, is outside the scope of the present study.
sizes that enable meaningful statistical analysis of the 
large number of security combinations generated by the 
above list, the CSEW sweeps were merged: 1992–1996; 
1998–2000; 2001/02 to 2004/05; 2005/06 to 2007/08 and 
2008/09 to 2011/12. The Appendix provides details of the 
data sets, methodology and the security devices exam-
ined for both victims and non-victims of burglary over 
time.
Analysis
This section places the analytic approach used in the study 
in a broader methodological context. Strong research 
designs are most straightforward where a single independ-
ent variable can be introduced in controlled conditions 
to observe its effect, if any, on the dependent variable to 
test the conjectured causal relationship. In relation to the 
security hypothesis, a different approach is necessary. The 
crime drops have occurred and the task is that of specify-
ing hypotheses that can be tested retrospectively with the 
available data, with statistical confidence in the results. The 
analysis here does not describe a randomised experiment. 
Instead it relies on data describing contrasts between 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ samples which occurred in an 
unstructured manner, both gradually out of landlords’ and 
home owners’ own initiative and with regards to secured 
by design as a result of discrete changes in policy.
The CSEW data on security installed both at victims’ 
homes at the time of burglary and non-victims’11 resi-
11 Non-victims refer to those households which have not encountered any 
type of burglary. Attempts are not discussed in this paper but in work not 
reported here they have been analysed similarly to burglary with entry, so 
they are not removed from the analysis or subsumed with non-victims.
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dences at the time of interview delineate a quasi-natural 
experiment contrasting burglary risks between house-
holds with and without security (Dinardo 2010). This 
allows testing the security hypothesis via examining any 
causal effects of security on burglary. Since the cause, 
security, cannot be manipulated a quasi-natural experi-
ment is not literally an experiment (Shadish et al. 2002). 
The methodology used to estimate the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the contrast between house-
holds with individual security devices and suites of them 
and those without security is the security impact assess-
ment tool (SIAT) originally developed to test the effec-
tiveness of car security devices (Farrell et al. 2011b).
The burglary risk for households without security is 
compared to the risk for households with a particular 
security device or combination of devices (both with 
respect to overall risk). The resulting metric, which is 
termed the security protection factor (SPF), shows how 
much less (or more) vulnerable a target is with given 
security devices compared to those with ‘no security’.12
Drawing on the above contrast provided in the CSEW, 
the present study develops a series of data signatures, 
whereby crime changes are consistent with expected out-
comes from distinct context mechanisms outcome pattern 
configurations (CMOCs, Pawson and Tilley 1997). Having 
said this examining context, delineated by area and house-
hold type—specific patterns of burglary risks and security 
uptake trends, is beyond the scope of the current work.13 
The methodology, which was originally developed to eval-
uate policy interventions using a realist evaluation 
approach, has acquired prominence in studies evaluating 
situational crime prevention interventions (Pawson and 
Tilley 1997). Each data signature is a discrete piece of 
empirical evidence that comprises a component of an 
overall triangulation approach to evaluation. As Eck and 
Madensen (2009: 69) highlight ‘[s]ignature changes con-
sistent with expected intervention mechanisms eliminate 
rival explanations’ whereas those which are ‘inconsistent 
with the expected intervention mechanism undermine the 
validity of the conclusion that the intervention produced 
the crime change.’ The closer an observed outcome follows 
the expected pattern from the activation of the preventive 
mechanisms and the fewer alternatives exist, the more 
confident we can be in attributing causality to it (Pawson 
and Tilley 1997). The five expected changes outlined in the 
"Domestic burglary and the security hypothesis" section 
12 By ‘no security’ we mean respondents who stated they had none of the 
listed security devices. Therefore this is not directly comparable before and 
after 1998 as the security devices included in the CSEW change (see Appen-
dix). However we attempt to adjust for this in Fig. 4 and the later Figs. 5 and 6.
13 Area type- and population group- specific estimates of the relationship 
between burglary risk and security during the crime drop is indeed beyond 
the scope of the current work and requires a different methodological 
approach to avoid omitted variables problems.
provide the data signatures pointing to the pivotal role of 
security in domestic burglary falls.
Findings
This section tests the five research hypotheses presented 
earlier, one at a time. Collectively these hypotheses illus-
trate the patterns expected if security measures were to 
have played a major part in domestic burglary with entry 
fall shown in the data section.
1. Was there an increase in overall levels of household 
security?
Figure 2 shows that between 1992 and 2011/12 there was 
a general increase in the proportion of households fitted 
with a range of security devices which preceded the bur-
glary falls (see earlier Fig. 1). Window locks were fitted to 
a little less than 50% of all households in 1992, but were 
fitted to a peak of 87% in 2009/10. Likewise double locks/
deadlocks were fitted to external doors in just over six in 
ten households in 1992, but to around eight in ten by 
2009/10. Burglar alarms were fitted to slightly more than 
10% of households in 1992, but close to three times as 
many by 2008/09. With the exception of security chains 
(which halved from 56.38 to 29.59%) all popular14 secu-
rity devices became widespread. However, combinations 
and the number of devices are not shown in Fig.  2. All 
that can be seen are trends in the proportion of house-
holds with each device without reference to the presence 
of any other device. Therefore the proportion of house-
holds with each device alone or any possible combination 
fitted has to be specified.
Figure 3 shows the most popular combinations fitted in 
households across the four periods of merged CSEW 
data, starting from 1998 to 2000—the period of sharp 
drop (see Fig.  1).15 With the exception of combinations 
including security chains, the proportion of households 
fitted with more than one device increased. Households 
with window locks and double or deadlocks on doors as 
their only security present and those having also external 
lights roughly doubled (from 8 and 4% in 1998–2000 to 
nearly 15 and 9% in 2008/09 to 2011/12, respectively). 
Moreover the steepest rise in window and door locks 
(and external lights) occurred between 1998 and 2001/02, 
the period of the sharpest burglary fall. The combination 
of window locks and double or deadlocks on doors 
remain the most popular security devices for households, 
14 These are defined here as security installed in more than 10% of house-
holds.
15 The 1992–1996 set of data is omitted in Fig. 3. The CSEW sweeps have 
not asked about an identical range of security devices fitted to households 
before and after 1998 impeding comparisons of exact security combinations 
with the 1992–1996 period.
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perhaps linked with insurance incentives or the spread of 
energy-saving storm windows (that is, double glass pan-
els known as ‘double glazing’ in England and Wales).
2. a. Was there a decrease in the proportion of house-
holds with ‘no security’? and
 b. Did their relative burglary risk rise?
The prevalence of households with ‘no security’ and 
their burglary risk relative to overall burglary risk is pre-
sented in Fig. 4. There was a major fall in the proportion 
of households with ‘no security’, reducing the supply 
of properties where none of the listed security devices 
are in place to make burglary with entry more difficult 
or risky. Households with ‘no security’ declined by 72% 
(from 17.65 to 4.90%) between 1992 to 1996 and 2008/09 
to 2011/12. The sharpest decline of around two-thirds of 
households with ‘no security’ measures occurred in the 
period 1992–1998 which directly preceded the sharp-
est burglary falls of the years 1997–2001/02 (Fig.  1). 
Although the decline between 1992–1996 and 1998–
2000 is partly an artefact of the increase in CSEW listed 
devices (the top line in Fig.  4 shows a respective 40% 
reduction in households with ‘no security’ as defined 
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in the earlier than the 1998 CSEW), the proportion of 
households with ‘no security’ continued to fall after 1998 
and remained low to around 5% for the remaining years.
Households with ‘no security’ are known to be at very 
high risk of burglary with entry (Budd 1999) and Fig.  4 
confirms this. Households with ‘no security’ were twice 
as likely as the general population to be burgled in 
1992–1996 and nearly eight times more so in 2008/09 
to 2011/12. Therefore households with ‘no security’ have 
experienced a fourfold increase in their relative burglary 
risk during the crime drop and especially since 2001/02. 
This agrees with the overarching assumption that secu-
rity was the main driver for the burglary falls.
Another hypothesis that builds upon the second part of 
the hypothesis addressed here is that there is more security 
among those targets that have seen the greatest decline in bur-
glary (see footnote 5). Indeed, the crime fall was uneven across 
different population groups and areas and property crime 
concentration has increased during the crime drop (Ignatans 
and Pease 2015, 2016). Owner occupiers, for example, whose 
homes have more security than rented accommodation, 
benefitted the most from burglary falls (Hunter and Tseloni 
2016; Tseloni and Thompson 2015). However examining this 
is beyond the scope of the current paper as it deserves to be 
addressed in a separate piece work (see footnote 13).
3. Was there an increase in the installation of more efficacious 
security devices and combinations of security devices?
Some security devices are more effective than others in 
reducing the risk of burglary with entry based on their 
SPFs from the 2008/09 to 2011/12 CSEW data (Tseloni 
et  al. 2014). Moreover, a greater number of security 
devices is generally more effective than fewer although 
the benefit of more than four devices is negligible. The 
most effective combination of two devices is window 
locks and door double or deadlocks (SPF = 13); the most 
effective combination of three involves adding external 
lights on a sensor (SPF = 34); and the most effective four 
adding internal lights on a timer (SPF = 49).
The protection conferred by suites of devices generally 
exceeds the sum of the impact of the separate devices. 
The value added from combining individual devices is 
given by the Net Interaction Effect (NIE) of security con-
figurations. For example, properties fitted with the four 
‘WIDE’ devices: window locks (W), indoor lights on a 
timer (I), door double or deadlocks (D) and external 
lights on a sensor (E) have an SPF of 49. The sum of the 
SPFs of the individual devices (W = 7, I = 3, D = 3 and 
E = 3) is, however, only 16. The WIDE NIE is, therefore, 
33 (calculated as 49 − 16). Of the 41 security suites exam-
ined, 28 had a positive NIE for burglary with entry. Five 
had zero NIEs and only eight had negative NIEs, of which 
more will be said later (Tseloni et al. 2014).16
Figure  5 shows the trajectories of security uptake for 
comparable efficacious combinations and single device 
presence during the period examined. The proportion of 
households with any of the three most efficacious secu-
rity combinations mentioned earlier (WD, EWD or 
WIDE) has almost doubled (84%) from 1998 (when com-
parable data exist) to 2011/12. From 1992–1996 to 
16 The calculations relating to NIEs here are based on rounded figures 
(Tseloni et al. 2014).
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 (%
) o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
ith
 'n
o 
se
cu
rit
y'
 -
Bu
rg
la
ry
 o
dd
s r
a
o
 Burglary odds rao of households with 'no security'
compared to all households
Percentage of households with 'no security'
Percentage of households with comparable 'no security' to
the pre-1998 list of devices
Fig. 4 ‘No security’ burglary with entry trends 1992–2011/12 Crime Survey for England and Wales. The definition of ‘no security’ alters after 1992–
1996, as the range of security devices asked about in succeeding batches of sweeps changes. The original ‘no security’ for 1998 is shown in the grey 
dotted line. Burglary odds ratio refers to 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1999 and from 2001/02 the years indicated in the x-axis
Page 8 of 16Tseloni et al. Crime Sci  (2017) 6:3 
2008/09–2011/12 the proportion of households with any 
security configuration that included window and door 
locks rose by 60%. Those with configurations of both 
locks and any lights (for comparability with the pre-1998 
data) more than doubled (146%). The steepest increases 
in efficacious security combinations had already occurred 
by 2001/02 in the period before and during the sharpest 
burglary fall. By contrast, there were almost two-thirds 
(64%) fewer households with just one device at the end of 
the period examined compared to 1992–1996. The great-
est decline occurred just before and at the start of the 
burglary falls (1992–1998).17 Summing up there has been 
a substantial increase in multiple security (also seen in 
Fig.  3) and especially in high efficacy combinations 
before, at the start and during the sharpest (10% annu-
ally) burglary drop in England and Wales (1992–
2001/02), accompanied by a speedy reduction in 
households with no (Fig.  4) or single device security in 
the period around the beginning of the fall (1992–1998). 
4. Was there an improvement in the efficacy of the secu-
rity devices?
Clearly, window and door locks can be stronger or 
weaker, alarm systems can be more or less extensive or 
sensitive and may or may not be connected to monitor-
ing stations, and lighting arrangements can vary in their 
17 Any individual security excludes CCTV cameras which were avail-
able to only 0.15% of households as a single device in the period 2008/09 
to 2011/12. Such negligible prevalence of CCTV cameras in households 
in effect does not influence the pre- and post-2008/09 comparisons of ‘no 
security’ and any suites of security devices. Overall (individually or in com-
bination with other devices) 4.6% of households had CCTV cameras.
intensity and responsiveness to movement. However, the 
CSEW has asked only about the presence or absence of 
security devices. It has not been designed to capture their 
quality, nor whether the devices were in use at the time 
of the victimisation. Nevertheless, if security has played 
a part in the crime drop, given that security measures 
appear to be effective in inhibiting burglary and given 
that quality varies, it is important to try to gauge whether 
their effectiveness had increased in ways that help explain 
the fall in burglary with entry. To try to estimate changes 
in efficacy we calculated the SPFs for burglary for the 
successive sets of CSEW data from 1992 to 2011/12. The 
results for the most frequently installed security combi-
nations (see Fig. 3) are shown in Fig. 6.
With one exception the trends are clear: The protective 
power of all commonly installed suites of security devices, 
increased exponentially over time even more than their 
presence (see Figs. 3, 5). This is suggestive of increased effi-
cacy (and implied quality improvements) and together with 
the previous discussion explains why burglary fell sharply 
while security did not expand to more households after 
1998 (see Fig.  4). Notwithstanding the security hypoth-
esis however the greatest ‘efficacy’ gains happened after 
2004/05, when burglary rates plateaued. This implies an 
uneven take up of efficacious security and large variations 
in burglary trends across areas and population groups (as 
already seen in the increasing burglary risk of ‘no secu-
rity’ households and the discussion of Fig. 4) which since 
2004/05 have averaged out nationally (see footnote 5).
The exception of increasing protective power over time 
refers to burglar alarms: The effectiveness of the security 
combination that incorporates a burglar alarm (EWBD) 
in Fig. 6 declined over time. Moreover adding a burglar 
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alarm (EWBD) to the combination of window locks, door 
double or deadlocks and external lights (EWD) reduces 
its efficacy for all years after 2000. It looks as if the addi-
tion of the burglar alarm to the EWD configuration of 
security devices led to less rather than more protection 
from burglary with entry since 2001/02.18 Figure 7 shows 
whether the addition of an alarm increases or decreases 
security for two sets of merged CSEW sweeps, 1992–
1996 and 2008/09 to 2011/12, across comparable security 
configurations.
The addition of an alarm resulted in a consistent 
increase but a consistent decrease in security in 1992–
1996 and 2008/09 to 2011/12, respectively, for the exam-
ined combinations.19 The paradoxical findings for EWD 
and EWBD in 2001/02 to 2011/12 are therefore part of a 
more general pattern and not exceptional nor confined to 
England and Wales (Bettaïeb 2015; ICPC 2015). From the 
various possible explanations for alarms’ ineffectiveness 
leading conjectures include the changing balance 
between risks and gains for the prospective burglar that 
alarms signal and/or alarms normalisation for home/con-
tents insurance coupled with poorer average quality over 
time (Tilley et al. 2015b). Further research is needed but 
what the findings so far suggest is that it would be unwise 
to assume that, although more security devices generally 
increase security, this is invariably the case.
Therefore over time security has become more wide-
spread and, with the exception of burglar alarms, works 
18 A full description of this work can be found in Tilley et al. (2015b).
19 The two panels in Fig. 7 need to be read with caution as the MSPFs are 
not precisely comparable (see Appendix).
better in deflecting burglaries. The results provide strong 
evidence that increasing adoption of efficacious suites of 
security devices produced growing protection from the 
risk of burglary with entry and are consistent with the 
security hypothesis.
5. Was there a much larger drop in burglaries that 
required that security be overcome than in those 
where no security had to be overcome?
The CSEW asks victims of domestic burglary a series 
of questions about the nature of the incident, relating 
to how the offence was committed and whether anyone 
was at home at the time it took place. Changes in the 
rate and distribution of these can be used as indicators 
for the relevance of security to the drop in burglary with 
entry. Specifically, if changing availability and quality of 
security were important in driving down burglary with 
entry it would be expected that the drops in burglary 
would be concentrated amongst those that required 
that security be overcome. Figure 8 shows trends of bur-
glary incidence rates from 1991 to 2011/12 distinguish-
ing across burglars’ modus operandi: forced entry, which 
involves forcing lock or window, breaking/cutting glass 
or breaking/removing door panel; unforced entry, which 
includes entering via doors or windows that were left 
open or unlocked; and other, such as burglar(s) having a 
key, pushed past, or entering by false pretences and other 
entry. The rate of burglary involving forced entry meth-
ods has dropped dramatically, while that using modus 
operandi involving unforced entry has remained rela-
tively stable. For example, burglaries with forced entry 
per 1000 households dropped from 31 in 1993 to 7 in 
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2006/07, a fall of 77%, while unforced entry burglaries 
remained at 7 per 1000 households in the same period.
Given that many security devices are activated (such as 
closing and locking doors and windows, priming alarms 
and switching on security lights) when a dwelling is left 
empty, if security devices are effective this should, in the-
ory, be manifested in greater falls in burglary with entry 
when no-one is at home. Figure 9 indicates that the main 
drop in burglary has occurred where the house is empty 
rather than when it is occupied. The data signatures 
delineated in Figs. 8 and 9 confirm the patterns expected 
if the security hypothesis is correct.
Discussion
The purpose of the research reported here was to 
extend the empirical test of the security hypothesis as 
an explanation for the widespread crime drop. To do so 
it examined the relationship between domestic burglary, 
household security devices and burglars’ modus oper-
andi over time based on data from the CSEW. The find-
ings support the hypothesis while they do not find that all 
devices were similarly responsible. The use of combina-
tions of security devices appears to have been particularly 
important, especially door and window locks plus secu-
rity lighting while, somewhat counterintuitively, alarms 
Fig. 7 Marginal security protection factors from the addition of burglar alarms to selected comparable security combinations: 1992–1996 and 
2008/09 to 2011/12 Tilley et al. (2015b)
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were not identified as contributory. The findings reported 
here align well with the positive findings for the security 
hypothesis reported earlier in relation to theft of and 
from vehicles cross-nationally and domestic burglary in 
the Netherlands.
The findings, however, reflect the limitations of the 
available data, excellent though the crime survey drawn 
on is. For example, the proportion of households with 
storm windows (double glazing) to all external doors and 
windows more than doubled while the rate of burglary 
with entry more than halved between 1996 and 2008 
(see Tilley et  al. 2015a). Moreover, some security meas-
ures are targeted at an area rather than individual house-
holds, the unit of analysis here. These include secured by 
design (SBD) housing planning and construction stand-
ards; levels of ambient lighting sometimes increased in 
the interests of crime prevention; alley-gating to restrict 
access to the backs of properties where covert access 
may otherwise be readily obtained; and the widespread 
use of and publicity for DNA-like property marking. The 
implementation of SBD planning and building stand-
ards, first introduced in the UK in 1989, greatly expanded 
from 1998 (Armitage and Monchuk 2011) which coin-
cides with the sharpest fall in burglaries (between 1997 
and 2001/02, Fig.  1). The relationship of all the above 
changes however with the burglary falls cannot be tested 
with CSEW data. Consequently, it is quite possible that 
the overall role of security, when more broadly defined, is 
understated by the present study.
The data do not speak to mechanisms through which the 
inhibition of some volume crimes may multiply preventive 
outcomes. These mechanisms include, for example, the 
inhibition of the onset of criminal careers by removing the 
easy opportunity for novice offenders to become crimi-
nally involved with their associates (the debut crime 
hypothesis) or the removal of easy opportunities to raise 
the money needed for purchasing illicit drugs and becom-
ing habituated to them in ways that foster further criminal 
behaviour. Testing whether these indirect crime-inhibiting 
out-workings of security induced falls in common acquisi-
tive crimes lies beyond the scope of this study and provides 
avenues for future research on the security hypothesis.20 
Other suggestions for expanding this work include context 
(reflected in area or household characteristics)-based anal-
ysis of the relationship (and the distributional justice) 
between security and crime trends; cost-benefit analysis 
(including carbon footprint costs) of fitting security; and 
investigating any diminishing marginal return of security 
in low risk areas (see footnote 5).
The research findings reported here have direct practi-
cal implications for maintaining or extending the crime 
drop. Previous research has shown that security is une-
venly distributed across the population (Tilley et al. 2011; 
Tilley 2012; Tseloni and Thompson 2015). Moreover, the 
poorest sectors of the population and those who rent 
property privately or from local authorities (in the USA 
public housing tenants) are amongst the most at risk of 
domestic burglary (Hunter and Tseloni 2016; Tseloni and 
Thompson 2015). Those who have already been victim-
ised are the most vulnerable of all and previous burglary 
victimisation is the single highest predictive factor of 
20 These important for the security hypothesis research questions may draw 
on longitudinal criminal careers data.
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current risk (Farrell and Pease 1993; Osborn and Tseloni 
1998). The clear finding that WIDE security devices 
(Window locks, Indoor lights on a timer, door double 
or Deadlocks and External lights on a sensor) produce a 
very substantial (almost 50 times) lower risk of burglary 
with entry than ‘no security’ suggests that these devices 
be targeted on the most vulnerable. Targeting could take 
the form of advice by police, insurance companies or 
government, subsidies for the installation of devices by 
charities or crime reduction partnerships, or legislation 
to decree that these devices be required as minimum 
standards to be met by property developers and by land-
lords for their tenants. The findings also suggest rethink-
ing advice regarding burglar alarms. It would be prudent 
to think twice before recommending an alarm as part of 
a standard package of security devices to reduce the risk 
of domestic burglary. Pending further research to under-
stand better why alarms are associated with increased 
rather than decreased risk of burglary with entry, the 
requirement by insurance companies that alarms be fit-
ted as a condition for continued coverage or for avoiding 
increased premiums becomes questionable.
Conclusion: where next?
The empirical evidence reported here lends support to 
the security hypothesis as an explanation for the crime 
drop. Research to date has largely established the criti-
cal role of vehicle security in reducing car crime cross-
nationally. The present study, drawing on triangulation of 
data signatures from sixteen sweeps of national victimi-
sation surveys covering the period 1991–2011/12 that 
describe a quasi-natural experiment, shows that increases 
in the prevalence and effectiveness of house security have 
been a major driver of the domestic burglary falls in Eng-
land and Wales. Therefore it expands coverage of the 
security hypothesis quite significantly.
The security hypothesis is important not only because 
it relates to the major question currently facing crimi-
nology, ‘Why did the long term trend of increasing 
crime reverse?’, but also because of its clear implica-
tions for crime prevention practice and policy. If secu-
rity has been largely responsible for the massive and 
unexpected falls in past volume crimes, including bur-
glary and theft of and from vehicles, crime policy 
should focus on reducing or pre-empting crime oppor-
tunities for new and emerging volume crimes, perhaps 
most notably cyber-crime, that have been facilitated by 
the internet.21
The results presented here do not prove the security 
hypothesis for the international crime drop. First, they 
21 We note that street crime did not switch to cyber-crime: the internet 
arrived too late and cyber-crime is a poor substitute for car theft and 
burglary (as argued by Farrell et al. 2015).
relate to one crime type in one jurisdiction. Second, 
they rely on data that do not describe a randomised 
but a quasi-natural experiment, studying the contrasts 
recorded by the CSEW, a very strong series of victimi-
sation surveys, between households with and without 
security devices. Indeed, the available data have been 
analysed to determine whether the precisely expected 
patterns that can be elicited are congruent with the 
security hypothesis. Therefore it has not been possible 
to control for all changes that have occurred. For exam-
ple, ideally changes in the quality of security devices, 
and/or area-based security improvements ought to have 
been measured and tested in relation to producing the 
overall drop in burglary. Likewise the research reported 
here for England and Wales could usefully be replicated 
in other countries where there has been a drop in bur-
glary (or where, conversely, burglary has risen) to ascer-
tain whether similar household security improvements 
(or relaxing of security) have been made elsewhere with 
a similar role in producing drops (or rises) in burglary. 
Therefore while the present study comprises a step in 
understanding whether and how security has contributed 
to the drop in burglary, there is more work to be done.
While there is room for doubt we conclude that for 
burglary with entry the evidence supporting the primary 
role of security is now beyond reasonable doubt. This evi-
dence also concurs with that for vehicle crime. We sug-
gest it is now up to others to find evidence that could 
falsify the security hypothesis as it relates to burglary and 
vehicle crime or to look to evidence in other jurisdictions 
and for other crime types to determine whether similar 
findings suggest likewise that security improvements 
have led to widespread falls in crime.
Although the security hypothesis has been tested in rela-
tion to some specific crimes, what is observed are drops 
in many types of crime across many countries. Yet wide-
ranging security developments, which Clarke (2016) refers 
to as an avalanche of security, now wash through much 
of everyday life. There is a need to catalogue those secu-
rity improvements, establish where and when they were 
introduced, and to identify and assess the relevant crime 
pattern change signatures. There is also a need for further 
research into whether security brought down violence 
either directly or indirectly. There is, in short, significant 
potential for further research into the security hypothesis.
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Appendix
Data and methodological clarifications
To increase the potential number of homes with any pos-
sible security configuration from the consistently avail-
able list of devices (see Table 1) adhering also to changes 
in this list and the survey’s sampling design, the various 
sweeps of the CSEW data have been merged to provide 
five composite data sets as follows:
1. 1992, 1994 and 1996 CSEW data formed the 1992–
1996 data set with reference period from January to 
December 1991, 1993 and 1995;
2. 1998 and 2000 CSEW data formed the 1998–2000 
data set referring to January to December 1997 and 
1999;
3. 2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05 CSEW data 
formed the 2001/02 to 2004/05 data set with con-
tinuous reference period from April 2001 to March 
2005;
4. 2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08 CSEW data formed 
the 2005/06 to 2007/08 data set with continuous ref-
erence period from April 2005 to March 2008; and
5. 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12 CSEW data 
refer to the period from April 2007 to March 2012.
When a victim reported repeat burglary incidents via 
more than one long Victim Form their home security 
availability at the time of the first burglary during the sur-
vey’s reference period has been retained for analysis22 
since the unit of analysis is the household.
The SIAT methodology requires information about 
security devices for both the general population and 
burgled households. Table  1 indicates the precise home 
security devices that were examined in both the Victim 
Forms and the Crime Prevention module from 1992 to 
2011/12.
Strictly speaking ‘no security’ is non-comparable over 
time except between the 1998 and the 2007/08 CSEW 
sweeps. ‘No security’ in the 1992–1996 sweeps means 
no burglar alarm, no double locks, no window locks and 
no lights. From the 1998 sweep onwards more questions 
were asked so in addition to the previous list, ‘no secu-
rity’ means no security chains, no indoor timer lights 
and no external sensor lights. The fact that ‘no security’ 
in the earlier 1992–1996 CSEW sweeps means something 
different to ‘no security’ in the following sweeps may to 
some extent explain the higher frequency of ‘no security’ 
prior to 1998. As shown clearly in Fig. 4 however it does 
not negate the considerable fall of households with ‘no 
security’ from 1992 to 1998. In theory ‘no security’ is not 
fully comparable for the pre- and post-2008/09 sweeps of 
the CSEW due to the introduction of questions about the 
availability of CCTV camera in the respondent’s home. 
In practice the negligible prevalence of CCTV camera 
(0.15% of households) removes such concerns. Therefore 
‘no security’ is comparable in principle during the period 
of substantial burglary falls, 1998–2007/08, and in prac-
tice from 1998 onwards.
The burglary risk for households without security is 
compared to the risk for households with a particu-
lar security device or combination of devices (both 
22 For example, in the 2008/09 to 2011/12 CSEW data 2.66% of burglaries 
with entry with available security information were repeats.
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with respect to overall risk) as shown in the following 
equation:
The resulting metric, which is termed the security pro-
tection factor (SPF), indicates the protection conferred 
by a security device or suite of devices compared to no 
security, with the distance of the obtained value from 1 
indicating the impact in relation to burglary, as outlined 
below:
Interpreting the security protection factor (SPF) metric
SPF value SPF interpretation
>1 Security device(s) associated with a 
lower risk of burglary
1 Security device(s) have no discern-
able impact on burglary risk
<1 Security device(s) associated with a 
higher risk of burglary
The SPF shows how much less (or more) vulnerable a 
target is with given security devices compared to those 
with ‘no security’ (see footnote 12). A score of two would 
mean that targets with the security measure(s) in place 
are at half the risk or in other words twice as safe as tar-
gets with no security devices. A score of 0.5 would indi-
cate that targets with the security measure(s) in place are 
half as safe or in other words face twice the risk as those 
targets with none of the listed security devices. Any score 
of over one, therefore, indicates less risk than a target 
with ‘no security’. Any with a score of less than one indi-
cates more risk than a target with ‘no security’.
Combinations of devices usually offer greater protec-
tion than the sum of the SPFs of each device included 
in the combination. The Net Interaction Effect (NIE) of 
security configurations indicates the value added from 
combining individual devices. It is calculated by subtract-
ing the sum of the SPFs of individual devices that make 
up each security combination from that of the combina-
tion. The findings discuss this further based on specific 
security combinations whereas Tseloni et al. (2014) pro-
vide complete results on the efficacy of security devices 
and their NIEs across all security combinations.
In order to determine whether the addition of a spe-
cific device more generally increases or decreases secu-
rity, marginal SPFs can be calculated using the SIAT 
(Tilley et al. 2015b). The marginal SPFs compare the risk 
of burglary with entry of households with a given set of 
security devices including, say, a burglar alarm, with that 
same set without a burglar alarm. The results can be read 
in the same way as SPFs in the previous table: A score of 
more than one indicates increased protection or reduced 
Burglary risk no security
Overall burglary risk
/Burglary risk with security
Overall burglary risk
burglary risk. A score of less than one indicates decreased 
protection from the addition of a burglar alarm to a con-
stellation of security devices.
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